The Strategic importance of the Metropolitan Widened Lines and Blackfriars Bridge in WWII

Book croppedAs it was recently the 75th anniversary of the start of the Battle of Britain the following may be of interest.

When building our model of Blackfriars Bridge station set in 1873 we were well aware that the present day bridge across Southwark Street was not the original. Among the resources we used to try to determine what it may have looked like we came across a book entitled “London Main Line War Damage” by BWL Brooksbank[1]. Helping us to understand the construction of the bridge girders, this book has several photographs on pp83-85 showing the damage to, and rebuilding of, the bridge. It also details all events involving enemy action that caused damage and disruption to rail services throughout the war in the entire London area.

What this book also gives is an insight specifically into what happened at the Blackfriars Bridge station site during the air raids and also into the importance of the line. The Metropolitan Extension of the London Chatham & Dover Railway provided that company with a line into the City of London and later formed links for traffic from the GNR and MR. In the Second World War it was to form an invaluable, even if extremely vulnerable, part of the railway system giving a route to get traffic such as coal to south east London and into the south east in general. The photographs of relevance to us in the book related to the severe air raids on 19-20 April 1941, which followed on from other heavy raids in the previous few days. It appears that a parachute mine had a direct hit on the Southwark Street Bridge at 22:15 on 19 April 1941 and information about the damage and restoration is given on page 80. Six lines over the bridge collapsed into the street below and the other two sidings were also damaged. Holborn and Blackfriars stations were closed. The down local line was reopened (for steam trains only, not electric) on 1 June and the down and up through lines were cleared by 2 June. The sidings on the west side had been made available for freight trains to work single line to Loughborough Junction. The up local line was not restored until 29 June. The same raid also caused damage to the signalbox at Blackfriars Junction (the original of which had been destroyed by fire in the attacks of 16-17 April and had been replaced by a temporary box with a frame of limited capacity) and all lines had been blocked. Blackfriars Goods was also damaged, at both high and low levels, with further damage to the stables, hydraulic hoists and a turntable. Several railway employees, including signalmen, were killed or injured.

There are quotes from a report by Lt Col Mount showing how extensive the damage was.

”’This is the most comprehensive damage of a girder bridge I have yet seen.’ Two of three girders (span 90ft) carrying four running lines collapsed into the roadway. A third girder, carrying some sidings on the east side, was pushed off abutments at one end. Also, considerable damage done to one of two main girders of separate bridge carrying the two ‘Market Sidings’ on west side. Latter bridge restored first, with trestling and leaving space for the double tram track. Siding lines slewed into the running lines to provide a single line for freight traffic. Meantime, trestling and steel joist weigh-beams to restore Up and Down Main lines and then the Local lines to be tackled.

“On 26 May, Mount reported that three tracks in operation, over steel trestling kindly lent by War Office. Trestling required for fourth track would be recovered from Blackfriars Road Bridge, also damaged in the raids. Rebuilding of bridge urgent, but required 1,000 tons steel: War Office, nor as before LMSR, cannot provide any more trestling at present, so SR CME prevailed upon.

“The Blackfriars main power signalbox close by, which had already suffered fire damage on 16/4 and was under repair, was completely destroyed. Four men, occupied hand-signalling, were sheltering in a steel bell-type refuge but killed by blast. Spare 24-lever power frame installed temporarily to work junctions either side of bridge.

Mount’s following comment shows how badly the Germans wanted to destroy the cross-Thames traffic. “It appears that the enemy has made several attempts to put the MWL[2] at Blackfriars out of use, and with other recent incidents at the river bridges it may indicate deliberate attack on cross-Thames communications.

The importance of the Metropolitan Extension is covered later on in the book (on page 137). The Thames crossings in the London area constituted the pinch points for traffic for South-East England. The evolution of the railway system had not resulted in crossings capable of conveying a substantial flow of freight over the Thames without major deviation. They were confined to the Chelsea and Barnes Bridges in West London, and the Blackfriars Bridge that connected the LPTB ‘MWL’ with the eastern section of the SR. The use of the East London Line between Spitalfields and New Cross had (ostensibly) been ruled out as a significant link.

There were concerns that the MWL may have been flooded by damage to massive sewers and water mains. The vulnerability of Blackfriars Bridge was also recognised. In December 1939 nearly 2,000 wagons were crossing the bridge each day (two thirds from the LNER and one third from the LMSR). New connections were put in at Kings Cross to allow traffic to be diverted, in an emergency, to the East London Line via the Metropolitan Line at Kings Cross. There was also a new crossover put in place at Ludgate Hill to enable either half of Blackfriars Bridge to be used. The other vulnerability of the line through Blackfriars Bridge was that the line was mainly on elevated sections with viaducts and many bridges.

Apart from the raids of April 1941 detailed above, some other raids deserve a mention to highlight the vulnerability of the system; there are many other examples in the book of damage and disruption relating to the old South Eastern and Chatham lines. The Blitz in September 1940 led to a suspension of traffic over the MWL on at least two occasions. A report of the situation on the morning of 9 September 1940 showed that the LNE goods services north and south of the Thames via both the ELR and MWL were suspended at the request of the Southern, while the SR reported that they were unable to accept any traffic from LMS or LNE via the MWL. … Later in the day the SR could accept a limited amount of priority traffic for Hither Green or Herne Hill via the MWL by prior arrangement. Restrictions remained in place for several days. In fact the problems appear to have persisted for about ten days. The LMS reported on 19 September that the most serious difficulty was working the traffic for the Central and Eastern Sections of the SR, having been unable to send it over the normal routes. From the previous night, however, it had been possible to send a few trains from Brent to Herne Hill and two other SR stations via the MWL. The following day there were more problems when a raid on the night of 19-20 September 1940 resulted in damage to the signalbox at Herne Hill, where all lines were affected. The Fast lines were clear by 08:00 on 21 September and normal working resumed at 16:30 on 23 September. The same raid also saw the Blackfriars to Elephant & Castle line hit by high explosive at Pocock Street/Hill Street, cutting the Through lines and the Local lines were considered unsafe. Traffic off the MWL was suspended until the lines were cleared at 08:40 on 21 September. The Down Through line was not reopened until 26 December 1940 and the Up Through line not until 10 February 1941!

The vulnerability of the MWL to flooding was shown by a raid on the night of 15-16 October 1940. A bomb penetrated the Clerkenwell tunnel at 03:35 and fractured the Fleet Sewer flooding the lines between King’s Cross and Farringdon. Normal working was resumed on 18 October.

[1] “London Main Line War Damage” by B W L Brooksbank. Published 2007 by Capital Transport Publishing. ISBN 978-1-85414-309-9

[2] Metropolitan Widened Lines